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Abstract
This Article examines the capacity of Chinese labor laws and labor institutions to combat
abuses. It finds that the Chinese regulatory framework pertaining to work relationships is impeded
by a failure to clarify key norms, a bureaucratic “command and control” approach to inspection
and dispute resolution, and a narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing compliance. The
Article, however, also finds evidence of emerging regulatory innovation and sophistication that
may lead to a much more effective legal response. The legal material relevant to China’s labor
abuses is vast and highly complex, so it is necessary to choose specific abuses to render the analysis manageable. This Article focuses on underpayment of wages for work performed for three
reasons. First, underpayment of wages is among the most common labor abuses, affecting many
millions of workers. Second, systematic underpayment of contracted wages is a practice that is
generally acknowledged, within and outside China, to be unjustifiable. Third, underpayment of
wages is apparently a violation of Chinese law, and thus raises the central question of this Article:
What is it about Chinese labor law norms and institutions that inhibit better compliance with the
law? Part I of the Article briefly describes the extent of the wage underpayment problem in China.
Part II concentrates on the internal structure of the legal rules and the legal institutions that regulate
work, especially with respect to remuneration. It analyzes the nature of the relevant legal rules, the
enforcement work of the bureaucracy, the principal labor dispute resolution institutions, and the
functions of the official trade union organization (which is treated as a quasi-regulatory agency).
Part II concludes by discussing a new draft national law and a promising regional initiative. Part
III sketches out several reform proposals. Drawing on successful international examples of regulatory innovation, as well as the recent creative Chinese experiments in labor enforcement, Part
III proposes regulatory initiatives that have realistic prospects of inducing greater adherence to the
law in China’s current political and economic context. Of course, no legal reforms will definitively
close the gap between the letter of labor law and workplace practice. Deficient implementation
of, and compliance with, labor law (and law in general) is universal. Even in developed countries,
labor regulation frequently fails to induce change in workplaces or provokes unintended outcomes.
This is unsurprising; work relations are characterized by disparate social systems (or frames of reference). Workplace participants determine their actions not just with a view to legal validity, but
also, or even more so, on the basis of such matters as cost-benefit calculations, concordance with
organizational decision-making and politics, consistency with local “custom and practice,” and
perspectives about appropriate gender roles. In light of this complexity, attempts to invoke law to

achieve a change in work relations practices may be ineffective, counterproductive, and incoherent. Nonetheless, there is now a rich literature that identifies which forms of legal interventions are
more likely to achieve positive outcomes in a given context. That literature informs this discussion
of reform in China. Regulatory scholars have suggested that, in many circumstances, “responsive,” “reflexive,” or “decentered” forms of regulation have proved to be superior alternatives to
traditional “command and control” style rule-making, with its emphasis on State-based standard
setting, coupled with the imposition of sanctions. Chinese labor law heavily emphasizes “command and control,” so there is certainly a need to consider alternative approaches. The analysis in
this Article is important for at least two reasons. First, China is frequently criticized for its labor
abuses, yet this criticism is frequently unaccompanied by specific reform proposals that are feasible in the Chinese context. This Article assists those who want to see improvements in Chinese
labor law to develop such proposals. Second, by pointing to the possibilities of regulatory innovation in the context of one problem (wage arrears), the author hopes to contribute to debates about
how Chinese law can respond more effectively to other kinds of labor, social, and environmental
problems.

MAKING CHINESE LABOR LAW WORK:
THE PROSPECTS FOR REGULATORY
INNOVATION IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Sean Cooney*
INTRODUCTION
China's extraordinary economic success is marred by widespread labor abuses, epitomized by the manufacturing sweatshop staffed by ill-treated workers migrating from China's hinterland.' Many kinds of abuse occur in apparent defiance of Chinese labor law. Firms breach labor contracts and wage
regulations by underpaying their employees for work performed,
or not paying them at all. They violate legal provisions on working hours by requiring staff to work for extreme periods of time
without rest. They ignore health and safety law by operating
egregiously dangerous workplaces.
In China, domestic pressure for reform of the labor laws is
powerful and increasing. Workers dissatisfied with the lack of
remedies for their mistreatment are resorting ever more frequently to self-help measures such as spontaneous protests,
many of which turn violent.2 These events are sufficiently serious to induce government officials and labor law scholars to develop an array of proposals for improving law enforcement.
Some of these proposals are ill-considered and makeshift; others
are carefully crafted and highly sophisticated. As the latter have
some potential to elicit broader compliance with the law, they
merit international attention and analysis.
This Article examines the capacity of Chinese labor laws and
* Associate Professor and Associate Director, Asian Law Centre, University of Mel-

bourne. The author would like to thank Mark Barenberg, Sarah Biddulph, Charles
Sabel, Ben Liebman, Lance Liebman, Richard Mitchell, and Randall Peerenboom for
their comments, as well as the Chinese scholars who participated in labor law roundtables he attended at Peking University Law School and Wuhan University Law School.
1. See, e.g., ANITA CHAN, CHINA'S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF
LABOR IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (2001); STEPHEN FROST, WORKERS' RIGHTS FOR THE
NEW CENTURY 16-36 (2002); KAI-MING Liu & SHEN TAN, KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI
ZEREN YU ZHONGGLJO SHEHUI [CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA] (2003).
2. See, e.g., China Rioters Clash with Police over Unpaid Wages, AsANEWS.rr, Sept. 30,
2005, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=4234 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
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labor institutions to combat abuses. It finds that the Chinese
regulatory framework pertaining to work relationships is impeded by a failure to clarify key norms, a bureaucratic "command and control" approach to inspection and dispute resolution, and a narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing
compliance. The Article, however, also finds evidence of emerging regulatory innovation and sophistication that may lead to a
much more effective legal response.
The legal material relevant to China's labor abuses is vast
and highly complex, so it is necessary to choose specific abuses
to render the analysis manageable. This Article focuses on underpayment of wages for work performed for three reasons.
First, underpayment of wages is among the most common labor
abuses, affecting many millions of workers. Second, systematic
underpayment of contracted wages is a practice that is generally
acknowledged, within and outside China, to be unjustifiable.'
Third, underpayment of wages is apparently a violation of Chinese law, and thus raises the central question of this Article:
What is it about Chinese labor law norms and institutions that
inhibit better compliance with the law?
Part I of the Article briefly describes the extent of the wage
underpayment problem in China. Part II concentrates on the
internal structure of the legal rules and the legal institutions that
regulate work, especially with respect to remuneration. It analyzes the nature of the relevant legal rules, the enforcement
wo6rk of the bureaucracy, the principal labor dispute resolution
institutions, and the functions of the official trade union organization (which is treated as a quasi-regulatory agency). Part II
concludes by discussing a new draft national law and a promising
regional initiative. Part III sketches out several reform proposals. Drawing on successful international examples of regulatory
innovation, as well as the recent creative Chinese experiments in
labor enforcement, Part III proposes regulatory initiatives that
3. Some neo-liberal lawyers and economists believe that minimum wages are
counter-productive, in which case their non-observance is unproblematic, even desirable. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 361-65 (5th ed. 1998). For a
more positive evaluation of minimum wages, see, for example, United Kingdom Low Pay
Commission, National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission Report 2005 (on file with author). Even given this neo-liberal view, however, the problem of wage arrears in China
must be addressed because it is not simply a case of payment below the minimum wage;
frequently workers are not paid at all for work performed. The issue goes to the enforceability of contracts, which neo-liberals, too, uphold. See POSNER, supra, at 101-08.
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have realistic prospects of inducing greater adherence to the law
in China's current political and economic context.
Of course, no legal reforms will definitively close the gap
between the letter of labor law and workplace practice. Deficient implementation of, and compliance with, labor law (and
law in general) is universal. Even in developed countries, labor
regulation frequently fails to induce change in workplaces or
provokes unintended outcomes.4 This is unsurprising: work relations are characterized by disparate social systems (or frames of
reference). 5 Workplace participants determine their actions not
just with a view to legal validity, but also, or even more so, on the
basis of such matters as cost-benefit calculations, concordance
with organizational decision-making and politics, consistency
with local "custom and practice," and perspectives about appropriate gender roles. In light of this complexity, attempts to invoke law to achieve a change in work relations practices may be
ineffective, counterproductive, and incoherent.
Nonetheless, there is now a rich literature that identifies
which forms of legal interventions are more likely to achieve positive outcomes in a given context.6 That literature informs this
discussion of reform in China. Regulatory scholars have suggested that, in many circumstances, "responsive," "reflexive," or
"decentered" forms of regulation have proved to be superior alternatives to traditional "command and control" style rule-making, with its emphasis on State-based standard setting, coupled
with the imposition of sanctions. Chinese labor law heavily emphasizes "command and control," so there is certainly a need to
consider alternative approaches.
The analysis in this Article is important for at least two reasons. First, China is frequently criticized for its labor abuses, yet
this criticism is frequently unaccompanied by specific reform
proposals that are feasible in the Chinese context. This Article
assists those who want to see improvements in Chinese labor law
4. See, e.g., REFLEXIvE LABOR LAw (Roger Rogowski ed., 1994); Cynthia Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Christine Parker et al., Introduction, in REGULATING LAW 1 (Christine
Parker et al., eds., 2004); Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF
LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAw (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1987).
6. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
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to develop such proposals. Second, by pointing to the possibilities of regulatory innovation in the context of one problem
(wage arrears), the author hopes to contribute to debates about
how Chinese law can respond more effectively to other kinds of
labor, social, and environmental problems.
I. ALL WORK AND NO PAY
Underpayment (and sometimes total non-payment) of
wages is widespread in China. Millions of Chinese workers fail
to receive agreed remuneration, with arrears amounting to
US$12,000,000,000 annually, according to official Chinese estimates. 7 Wage arrears are common in all parts of the economy.8
While arrears occur frequently in the State-owned parts of the
economy, non-payment of wages in the private sector is an increasingly acute problem. This is because the private sector,
with its vast number of business entities and manifold organizational forms, is an ever more significant employer of labor in the
Chinese economy.9 An International Labor Organization
("ILO") study reports that anywhere from fifty percent to eighty
percent of private enterprises in Guangdong Province, China's
manufacturing powerhouse, illegally retain wages.1 ° The practice is so prevalent it is sometimes described as a "local cus1
tom." 1
Most importantly, underpayments in the private sector occur not simply because firms are in economic difficulty (and
therefore unable to comply with their legal obligations); in many
cases it is simply fraudulent and manipulative conduct on the
part of the debtor employer. 12 For example, it is common for
employers to demand that workers pay a bond prior to com7. See Defaulting Wage Payment Should Be Incriminated, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 8,
2005, http://www.china.org.cn/english/null/122105.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
8.

See BUREAU

OF DEMOCRACY,

HUMAN

RIGHTS, AND LABOR,

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE,

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs-2005: CHINA, § 6(e) (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2OO5/61605.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
9. See generally TOSHIKi KANAmoRI & ZHIJUN ZHAO,ASIAN DEV. BANK INST., PRIVATE
SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2004).
10. See Gerard Greenfield & Tim Pringle, The Challenge of Wage Arrears in China, in
PAYING ATrENTION TO WAGES 30, 35 (Manuel Simon Velasco eds., 2002).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Anita Chan, Labor Standards and Human Rights: The Case of Chinese
Workers Under Market Socialism, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 886, 891-93 (1998).
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mencing work. 3 This practice, together with the retention of
wages, is used extensively in order to impose labor discipline
and
1 4
prevent staff turnover, especially during holiday periods.
One group of Chinese workers is particularly vulnerable to
wage arrears: migrant laborers (that is, workers migrating from
China's rural areas or nongmingong). They are regularly accorded treatment inferior to their urban counterparts. It is they5
who bear the brunt of labor abuses, including underpayments.1
Estimates of migrant workers vary widely, but they number
well in excess of 100,000,000.16 They are often in poor health" v
and remain dependent on their home communities for social
security support.'
There is an entrenched view among firm
managers that it is acceptable to accord migrant workers worse
treatment. 9 On the other hand, in comparison with migrant
workers, the local residents are generally much better educated,
much better connected politically and economically, and much
more likely to occupy a skilled or managerial position in, or in20
deed to own, enterprises employing rural workers.
13. See id. at 889-91; see also Anita Chan, Globalization, China's Free (Read Bonded)
Labour Market, and the Chinese Trade Unions, 6 ASIA PAC. Bus. Rv. 260, 261-68 (2000).
14. See GREENFIELD & PRINGLE, supra note 10, at 35.

15. The poor treatment of migrant workers has been widely chronicled. See, e.g.,
LANCE COMPA, AM. CTR. FOR INT'L LABOR SOLIDARITY, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE
FOR

WORKER

RIGHTS

IN

CHINA

44-55 (2005);

KAIMING

Liu,

BIANVUAN

REN

[THE

MARGINALISED PEOPLE] (2003); DOROTHY SOLINGER, CONTESTING CrIZENSHIP IN URBAN
CHINA:

PEASANT MIGRANrTS, THE STATE, AND THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET (1999).

Individ-

ual accounts by women migrant workers telling of their poor conditions are regularly
collected and published on the website of the Chinese Working Women Network. See
Chinese Working Women Network Website, http://www.cwwn.org (last visited Jan. 19,
2007).
16. According to a Chinese National Bureau of Statistics report, there were 113.9
million workers from rural China in 2003. Of these workers, 69.9 percent traveled to
Eastern provinces, and 47.3 percent were under twenty-five years of age. See Migrant
Workers Number 113.9 Million in 2003, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 2004, available at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/.
17. See, e.g., the 2001 survey of 1043 workers by Chinese Working Women Network,
The Health 2001 Survey Report of Migrant Women Workers (Chinese Working Women Network ed., 2001) (reporting that thirty-seven percent of respondents experienced fainting spells).
18. See LIu, supra note 15, at 12-13.
19. See, e.g., John Knight et al., Chinese Rural Migrants in Urban Enterprises: Three
Perspectives, 35 J. DEv. STUD. 73, 92 tbl.13 (1999) (surveying managerial attitudes towards migrants in 118 enterprises in four major Chinese cities). The most significant
reason given for recruiting migrant workers is that they can "bear hardship." Id. at 91.
20. See SALLY SARGENSON, REWORKING CHINA'S PROLETARIAT 67 (1999). The distinc-

tion between urban and rural workers has been institutionalized by the household re-
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II. NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF LABOR LAW. FACTORS
21
INTERNAL TO THE EGAL SYSTEM
Clearly, violations of core labor law principles are rife in
China-millions of workers are not paid their due wages for
their labor. While no legal system can entirely eradicate these
abuses, one may well ask why the law does not do more to reduce
their prevalence. This Part explores the facets of formal Chinese
labor regulation that blunt and confuse its capacity to speak authoritatively to workplaces.
A. The State of Legal Rules
1. The Labor Law
At first glance, China appears to have built up a relatively
comprehensive and logically ordered framework of labor regulation. The Labor Law of 1994 ("Labor Law") establishes a contract-based system of employment regulation2 2 based on "voluntary" and "equal" negotiation, and replaces the former communist system based on administrative allocation.2 3 The Labor Law
also stipulates a number of minimum standards with which employment arrangements must comply.
The Labor Law is a major legislative achievement. On
closer examination, however, it has serious limitations. 24 It provides only the skeleton of a regulatory framework, with its artigistration, or hukou system, which has specified for every Chinese citizen their place of
residence and classified them as either agricultural or non-agricultural (i.e., urban).
However, the Labor Law draws no formal distinction in the application of key norms on
the basis of hukou; urban and rural workers are equally entitled to the protections of
the Labor Law. See Liu, supra note 15, at 139-67, 209-44; Fei-Ling Wang, Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China's Hukou System in the 2000s, 177 CHINA Q.
115 (2004).
21. For comprehensive accounts of the Chinese legal system, see generally STANLEY
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999) and RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW (2002).
On
implementation issues, see generally Jianfu Chen, Implementation of Law in China-An
Introduction, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA I (Jianfu
Chen et al. eds., 2002) and NEIL DIAMANT ET AL., ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE,
SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE (2005).
22. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [Labor Law of the P.R.C.]
(promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1994, effective May 1, 1995) art. 17
[hereinafter Labor Law].
23. See HILARY JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 41-48 (2003); RONALD KEITH &
ZHIQIU LIN, LAW AND JUSTICE IN CHINA'S NEW MARKETPLACE 93-127 (2001).
24. See VIRGINIA Ho, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR RIGHTS AND LEGAL REFORM 196-200 (2003).
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cles either supplemented by subordinate legal instruments produced by various State agencies (which number in the
thousands) 2" or left unelaborated. The rules pertaining to arrears illustrate this point because bright-line rules rendering this
abuse unlawful are not readily available.
2. Underpayment of Wages
Article 50 of the Labor Law stipulates that: "Wages shall be
paid monthly to workers in person in the form of cash. Wages
shall not be misappropriated (kekou) nor shall the employer fall
in arrears (tuoqian) without justification. ' 26 Provisions complementary to Article 50 require parties to the employment rela27
tionship to abide by their contractual commitments.
While these provisions appear to generate straight forward
obligations to pay wages, they are very vague. They do not define wages. They do not spell out how they can be varied. They
do not provide for wage records to be kept and given to employees. They do not explain what forms of labor service generate
an entitlement to wages; for example, what happens if there is
no work to be performed or an employee is sick or must perform
a public duty? They do not explain how to deal with a situation
where an employer-employee relationship is obscured by a network of contractual arrangements. They do not clarify what
"misappropriation" or "delay without justification" mean or
whether, for example, an employer is permitted to retain a
bond.
The lacunae in the regulatory framework are filled to some
extent by subordinate legal instruments issued by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security ("MOLSS") .28 Even these subordinate
instruments do not address, however, the legality of bonds. It is
not until we come to low-level Ministry "Notices" that we find
25. See, e.g., China's Ministry of Labor and Social Security Website, http://trs.
molss.gov.cn/was40/mainframe.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (listing subordinate legal instruments that supplement the Labor Law). This list does not include many provincial and local rules.
26. See Labor Law, art. 50.
27. See Labor Law, arts. 17, 48.
28. See, e.g., Gongzi Zhifu Zhanxing Guiding [Temporary Regulation on the Payment of Wages] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Dec. 6, 1994, effective Jan. 1,
1995); Dui "Gongzi Zhifu Zhanxing Guiding" youguan Wenti de Buchong Guiding
[Supplementary Regulation on Questions Concerning the Temporary Regulations on
the Payment of Wages].
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explicit statements that employers are not permitted to require
employees to furnish any kind of bond or security. A Notice directed at the private sector 29 provides: "An enterprise must not
collect currency, or other objects as 'security upon entering the
factory' (ruchang diya), and must not detain an employee's iden30
tity card or temporary resident card, or hold them as security."
A major reason for the lacunae in the regulatory framework
is that the Chinese legal system creates a radical separation between employment contracts and other types of contractual relationships. 1 This sharp delineation is apparently made for ideological reasons; it preserves in legal form the ideological position
that Chinese workers are not commodities.3 2
As the national contract law does not apply to employment
contracts, there is no contractual substratum like the one underpinning employment contracts in common law or other major
civil law systems. It is thus a legal error to draw on general contractual principles to determine the legal rules applicable to, for
example, central issues in wage disputes such as when, how, by
whom, and to whom wages must be paid; the circumstances in
which non-payment may be justified; and, where wages are not
paid in accordance with law, how compensation is to be determined.
This means that the Labor Law and related legislation
should comprehensively spell out the major principles relating
to labor contracting. While the Labor Law deals with individual
labor contracts, however, its specific treatment is limited to only
twenty-one articles,3 3 ten of which solely concern termination. 4
The Labor Law is silent on matters such as variation, capacity,
interpretation, the implications of terms, the effect of work en29. See Guanyu Jiaqiang Waishang Touzi Qiye he Siying Qiye Laodong Guanli
Qieshi Baozhang Zhigong Hefa Quanyi de Tongzhi [Notice Concerning Strengthening
the Real Protection of Workers' Lawful Rights and Interests in Foreign Invested and
Private Enterprises] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Public Security, and the All China Federation of Trade Unions, Mar. 4, 1994).
30. Id. cl. 2.
31. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [Contract Law of the P.R.C.]
(promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Contract Law]. Article 123 of the Contract Law provides that "where other laws
stipulate otherwise on contracts, such provisions shall govern." Id. art. 123.
32. See HUAI GUAN, LAODONG FAXUE [LA~oR LAw] 215 (5th ed. 2001). For a critique of this position, see KEITH & LIN, supra note 23, at 110-11.
33. See Labor Law, arts. 16-32, 97-99, 102.
34. See id. arts. 23-32.
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gaged in under an invalid contract, the rules of contract performance, transfer of business, and the principles for determining compensation for breach.
It is clear that the important rules governing underpayment
of wages are not readily ascertainable by those who wish to assert
their rights. They are not located within the texts of major laws.
Indeed, one of the most significant rules-that against taking
bonds-is buried in low-level Notices. Furthermore, while these
subordinate instruments themselves seem to be publicly available from the MOLSS website (although this is not always up-todate), availability is quite different from accessibility. The scattered location of the applicable rules defies easy retrieval. 5
To be sure, it is not only in China that legal concepts, including those pertaining to the employment relationship, evolve
in a piecemeal and fragmented fashion. The Chinese can
scarcely be criticized because the elaboration process has had to
be compressed into a few years rather than centuries as in Western legal systems. What is distinctively problematic about the
Chinese mode of elaboration, however, is that the pursuit of detail takes an inquirer ever further away from laws directed at the
general public often to temporary legal instruments primarily
designed for and directed at State agencies.3 6 The people informed about the legal position are the labor bureaucracy rather
than, at least in the first instance, employers, employees, or the
courts.
3. "Non-Standard Workers"
In addition to the shortcomings specific to remuneration,
there is further limitation that underlies the framework regulating labor law as a whole. As mentioned earlier, the Labor Law
creates a radical separation between employment contracts and
other types of contractual relationships. This separation fails to
recognize one of the dominant challenges for contemporary labor regulation. Increasingly, work relationships are no longer
typified by the putative subject of traditional employment regulation: long-term employees engaged by a clearly identifiable em35. See Ho, supra note 24, at 194-96.
36. Thus, labor regulation is frequently addressed to labor bureaus in the various
provinces and relevant ministries.
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ployer.3 7 The traditional boundary between an employee and an
"independent contractor," fundamental to the conceptual structure of labor law, has become very blurred. This global trend is
mirrored in China. As the vestiges of the command economy
disappear and global supply chains anchor their labor intensive
manufacturing in a vast network of Chinese firms, new forms of
work arrangements are proliferating, many of them short-term
and precarious.3 8
Many societies have sought to adapt their regulatory framework in response to these changes in work arrangements, so as
to avoid seeing increasing numbers of people working outside
that framework. China's Labor Law and labor institutions, however, very much persist with the traditional approach and the
complete legal uncoupling of labor contracting from general
contracting accentuates this. While the Labor Law is broad in
terms of the types of enterprise it covers, 9 it applies only to certain categories of workers, namely to "workers (laodongzhe) who
form a labor relationship (laodong guanxi) with enterprises ...."40 This phrase sets the boundary between those workers to whom the Labor Law standards apply and those whose
work relations are governed by the general contract law. However, the phrase is quite vague-it is not apparent how it should
be applied to work relationships that could be categorized as either employer-employee or as two independent contractors.
Such relationships include home-workers (or outworkers) in the
textile industry or individual trades-people in the construction
industry.
A second boundary question concerns the situation in
which a worker is clearly an employee, but it is difficult to identify the employer. Such a problem arises where workers are
transferred between firms, when firms merge or divide, or in
long-term labor hire arrangements. This problem is also not adequately addressed in Chinese law.
Guidance on how to decide whether a person is a worker for
37. See generally
KATHERINE W.

MANUEL CASTELLS,

THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY

STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:

EMPLOYMENT REGULATION

(1996);
FOR THE

(2004).
38. See Mary Gallagher, "Time is Money, Efficiency is Life". The Transformation of Labor
Relations in China, 39 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 11, 21-26 (2004).
39. See GUAN, supra note 32, at 148-49.
40. Labor Law, art. 2.
CHANGING WORKPLACE
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the purposes of the Labor Law is crucial. Not only does this decision indicate whether labor standards apply to that person, but
it also determines whether the labor bureau and the labor disputes arbitration committees have jurisdiction, and whether the
person is eligible to be a union member.
Many legal experts in China are alert to the deficiencies of
the Labor Law framework: One important response is that a Labor Contract Law has been drafted nationally.4 1 This Law may
make it much easier for employers and employees to determine
their rights and obligations in relation to the payment of wages,
and indeed for bureaucrats to understand what rules they must
implement.
Moreover, several provincial level congresses have already
enacted their own local regulations on labor contracts or
wages.4 2 While these different local initiatives lead to further
fragmentation and inconsistency, they may provide models for
law at the national level. The draft national law and a promising
local attempt to create a comprehensive and comprehensible
framework (responding not only to the need to specify clear
norms but also to problems with enforcement) are examined at
the end of this Part.
B. Enforcing the Rules: BureaucraticImplementation
Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with exactly identifying the relevant legal norms, many of the more extreme instances of withholding wages can be safely characterized as unlawful. The widespread nature of these abuses suggests that the
institutions charged with securing compliance with the law have
severe shortcomings. This section and the following two sections
examine these shortcomings insofar as they relate to the legal
character of these institutions.
There are three main, interrelated State vehicles for implementing labor law: enforcement by State agencies, dispute resolution processes, and monitoring by the official trade union organization. In China, the burden for ensuring that labor laws
41. See infta Part III.
42. See, e.g., Guangdong Sheng Gongzi Zhifu Tiaoli [Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the
Guangdong Provincial People's Cong., Feb. 19, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Guangdong Wage Regulations].
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are enforced is placed even more heavily on administrative agencies than it is in many other countries. Most labor law norms (as
with very many legal rules in China) take the form of "command
and control" regulations.4" Legal instruments state rules, charge
an agency with implementing them, and then set out a range of
sanctions that that agency or another state agency can impose if
the rules are violated.
The main institutions responsible for implementing labor
law are the "labor administration departments established under
people's governments above county level" (xianji yishang geji
renmin zhengfu laodong xingzheng bumen).44 These local labor departments, which operate both under the MOLSS and under
their local provincial or municipal government, have jurisdiction
over most aspects of labor law within their area, with the important exception of occupational health and safety.45 The Labor
Law requires labor departments to "supervise and inspect" (jinxingfiandujiancha)employer compliance with labor regulation.4 6
They do so through inspectorates established in the principle
provincial/municipal departmental offices and in local branch
and sub-branch offices.
The precise responsibilities, procedural rules, and enforcement powers of labor inspectors were until very recently governed mainly by a complex set of rules promulgated at various
times by the MOLSS as well as by other governmental organs at
the provincial and municipal level. Fortunately, the State Council's 2004 Labor Inspection Regulations have authoritatively updated and consolidated these rules.4 7
The Labor Inspection Regulations, elaborated in supplementary rules promulgated by the MOLSS,4 8 establish a clear
43. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION:

LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 4, 245-

56 (1994).
44. Labor Law, art. 85; see Laodong BaozhangJiancha Tiaoli [Regulations on Labor Protection Inspection] (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 26, 2004, effective
Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Labor Inspection Regulations].
45. See Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 35.
46. Labor Law, art. 85.
47. See Labor Law, art. 85; see also Labor Inspection Regulations (promulgated by
the State Council, Oct. 26, 2004, effective Dec. 1, 2004).
48. See Guanyu Shishi Laodong BaozhangJiancha Tiaoli Ruogan Guiding [Certain
Provisions Concerning Implementation of the Regulations on Labor Protection Inspection] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security ("MOLSS"), Jan. 24,
2005, effective Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions].
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process for dealing with allegations concerning violations of the
Labor Law. Any person or organization may report a violation of
the law to their local labor department, and any worker whose
rights or interests have been violated by an employer may lodge
a complaint within two years of becoming aware of the violation. 49 These include complaints about unpaid wages, which are
the most common complaints in some areas.50
If the complaint is accepted, departmental officers must investigate it. They may exercise wide powers to enter premises,
interview people, engage accountants, collect data, and preserve
evidence.5" If they find that breaches of the legislation and rules
have occurred, the local labor departments can exercise a range
of powers. They can order a firm to cease a wrongful act and
"make corrections" (zelinggaizheng)52 within a specified time period, 53 and order a firm to provide compensation for harm
caused.5 4 The local labor departments can also impose a range
of administrative penalties (or sanctions, chufa).5
This analysis suggests thus far that Chinese labor departments have the authority and powers necessary to force employers to observe the law. There are many factors, however, blunting their potential effectiveness. First, the disorderly state of legal rules means that local agencies may observe rules or policies
devised by themselves or related agencies rather than higher inconsistent legal instruments, which formally have greater authority.
Second, and more significantly, the sanctions that labor departments can deploy against egregious violators are actually
49. See Labor Inspection Regulations, arts. 9, 20.
50. See Isabelle Thireau & Hua Linshan, One Law, Two Interpretations: Mobilizing the
Labor Law in Arbitration Committees and in Letters and Visits Offices, in ENGAGING THE LAW
IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 91.
51. See Labor Law, art. 86; Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 15; Labor Inspection
Implementing Provisions, arts. 26-29.
52. Labor Law, arts. 85, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 98.
53. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [Administrative Punishments Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996,
effective Oct. 1, 1996) art. 23.
54. See Labor Law, art. 91.
55. The Labor Inspection Regulations and subordinate legal instruments produced by the MOLSS delineate the scope of these penalties and the principles governing their imposition. These rules clarify the amount of compensation that can be
ordered, the various punishments for breaches of the Labor Law, and the procedures
for imposing those punishments.
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quite weak. Firms clearly orient their actions not simply on the
basis of legality, but, even more so, in accordance with cost-benefit calculations. Sanctions need to be sufficiently powerful to
overcome incentives not to comply with the law. These incentives are extremely strong in many Chinese firms. They face constant pressure to lower their labor costs by illegal means, such as
through breaching labor contracts. Evasion of labor law by some
firms creates immense pressure on other firms that might initially have a stronger disposition to abide by the law. This cascade effect is well illustrated in China's export-oriented manufacturing sector. If a firm in that hypercompetitive environment,
struggling to meet its supply deadlines, knows that its rivals will
fail to pay agreed wages, and knows that these rivals are very unlikely to be punished, it faces a choice between adhering to the
law and survival. 56 Most firms are likely to choose survival over a
steadfast but suicidal commitment to the law.
Firms using low-skilled migrant labor have been especially
prone to violate the law because their workers have, at least until
recently, been unable to use labor market pressures to compel
the employer to act lawfully. Threats to exit the firm unless the
law is obeyed have carried little weight because of China's huge
labor surplus, 57 although recent unskilled labor shortages in cer-

tain cities may indicate that poor working conditions have at last
deterred many rural workers. 5 ' Further, as discussed below, industrial action to force compliance has no legal status or protection and union officials (who are often also managers or party
59
officials) discourage it.

In these circumstances, the economic incentives for noncompliance with the law need to be countered by credible legal
sanctions, which are generally not available to labor departments. Where employers fail to heed formal warnings, or refuse
to obey correction orders, labor departments are limited to imposing fines and compensation orders in most instances. The
usefulness of these measures is attenuated by the labor depart56. See Liu & TAN, supra note 1, at 83-85.
57. According to official estimates, there are 150 million surplus rural workers, in
addition to the more than 100 million migrant rural workers. See Migrant Workers Number
113.0 Million in 2003, supra note 16.
58. See, e.g., Brian Ho, Is There a MigrantLabor Shortage in China?, 2 CSR ASIA WKLY.
8, 8-9 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://www.csr-asia.com/index.php?p=5764.
59. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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ment's reliance on judicial compulsory execution procedures to
force unwilling firms to pay. 60 On the other hand, the law does
not enable labor departments to deploy sanctions such as cessation of business, confiscation of earnings, or revocation of license against cases of underpayment of wages.
The restriction on sanctions available to labor departments
is partly a consequence of important administrative reforms directed at preventing bureaucratic agencies from arbitrarily inflicting a wide range of punishments on individuals. Viewed
from an administrative law perspective, the restrictions seem appropriate in a system where arbitrary action has been notorious.
On the other hand, an unfortunate by-product of these reforms
in the labor context is that these restrictions limit the scope of
credible threats that can be made to a recalcitrant employer.
Relatively effective enforcement strategies often involve the ability to "escalate" interventions.6 1
Third, although, as we have also seen, employees individually and collectively are entitled to lodge complaints with labor
departments, they have difficulty compelling a department to
pursue a case where it is unwilling to devote resources to the
case. Labor inspectors have considerable discretion to dismiss
complaints if they consider them trivial or already remedied, or
if they cannot substantiate the complaints. 62 Labor inspectors
can also dismiss employee complaints if the complaint is made
more than two years after the violation, if the employees are unable to identify the correct employer (which may be difficult in
the context of complex supply chains) or if the labor department considers the matter outside its jurisdiction.6 3
The steady improvements in administrative law mean that
employees can seek both internal administrative reconsideration
and judicial review of a decision not to pursue a labor complaint.
Unfortunately, neither administrative reconsideration nor judicial review of administrative actions is well-used to secure compliance with a statutory duty, nor are they particularly effective.6 4
Administrative review is hampered by the unwillingness of agencies to accept complaints and to correct improper decisions
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See
See
See
See
See

Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 44.
infta notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 35.
id. art. 18.
PEERENBOOM, supra note 21, at 399-424.
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(often as a result of local political or economic pressures) and by
a lack of proper procedures. Judicial review is restricted by the
inability of the courts to invalidate administrative rules, and by
the generally conservative approach taken by courts to the scope
of their review powers. Both processes are impeded by lack of
public knowledge about, or fear of, legal procedures, compounded by the failure of agencies to inform citizens of their
remedies (despite being legally obliged to do so).65
Moreover, employers rather than employees are best placed
to take advantage of administrative law reforms. Unscrupulous
employers may invoke them to stall and dissuade labor departments from implementing the law. Thus, where a labor department proposes to impose a large fine, it must, at its own expense, arrange for a hearing in which the parties enjoy extensive
procedural rights, including a right to representation.6 6 Further, administrative penalties are quite often challenged. 67 Specifically, error on the part of a labor department officer can lead
to invalidation of the penalty68 or to sanctions being imposed on
the officer rather than the firm. 69 It is understandable that inexperienced departmental staff, lacking legal qualifications and
often lacking resources, may be reluctant to pursue an employer
prepared to exhaust its legal options.
Fourth, corruption and local protectionism can set the prevailing agenda for the bureaucracy. 70 In accordance with Chinese administrative practice,7 1 local labor departments have two
masters: they are subordinate both to higher level units of their
65. See id. at 418.
66. See Laodong Xingzheng Chufa Tingzheng Chengyu Guiding [Regulation on
Hearing Procedures for Administrative Punishments with Respect to Labor] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Sept. 27, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996).
67. Challenges to administrative punishments accounted for almost half of all applications for administrative. See ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA]
1072 (2004).
68. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996,
effective, Oct. 1, 1996), arts. 6, 35.
69. See id. art. 44.
70. See Feng Ye, The Chinese Procuratorateand the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the
People's Republic of China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAw IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, supra note 21, at 113, 117-18; Andrew Wederman, The Intensificationof Corruption
in China, 180 CHINA Q. 895 (2004).
71. See Benjamin van Rooij, China's System of Public Administration, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 323, 329-31, 341-42.
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ministry (the MOLSS) (the vertical or tiao relationship) 72 and to
the provincial congress and government of the area in which
they operate (the horizontal or kual relationship). Since local
governments' staff and fund labor departments, these governments often have the upper hand in directing the day-to-day
work of departmental

officers.7"

Indeed, local governments

often have close links to businesses under scrutiny or manage
4
those businesses.

7

Fifth, the quantity of labor inspectors may well be inadequate to implement the law systematically across the country.
While there are more than 3,000 inspecting agencies and 40,000
labor inspectors, 5 this number is dwarfed by the number of business entities in China-around thirty million.7 6
Finally, despite the potential sanctions for so doing, firms
adopt extensive strategies to frustrate inspection work. For example, in the event that bribes do not succeed, many firms keep
false records and coach workers so that when an external inspection into working conditions takes place, the inspectors are
deceived. 7 7

C. Enforcing the Rules: Dispute Resolution Procedures
The shortcomings in bureaucratic enforcement render it all
the more important for workers to be able to enforce their rights
through formal dispute resolution processes.7 8 This form of enforcement process enables workers to be directly engaged in
seeking compliance. When a complaint is referred to a labor
department, workers lose control of it, in the sense that labor
departments cannot be readily compelled to act in workers' interests. On the other hand, dispute resolution procedures constitute workers as parties, with the ability to structure the claim
and pursue the issue to conclusion.
The centerpiece of the Chinese labor dispute resolution
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 7.
See van Rooij, supra note 71, at 149, 164-68, 330.
See BILL TAYLOR ET AL., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CHINA 43-45, 47-76 (2003).
See ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [LAw YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 45 (2003).

76. See KANAMORI, supra note 9, at 24.

77. See CHAN, supra note 1, at 123-25; Liu & TAN, supra note 1, at 76-79.
78. For excellent studies on this topic, see generally Ho, supra note 24, and
SHANGYUAN

ZHENG,

LAODONG

ZHENGYI

CHULI

CHENGXUFA

DE

MODERNISATION OF LABOR DIsPUTEs ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE LAw]

XIANDAIHUA

(2003).

[THE
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process is labor arbitration. According to the Labor Law, all formal disputes that cannot be resolved by mediation within an enterprise should be channeled through arbitration. Arbitration is
an essential precondition, not an alternative, to litigation. 7 9 A
worker cannot directly file suit in a court, even for a claim for
unpaid wages (a simple debt) without first going through arbitration. o
Labor arbitration operates as follows. When a labor dispute
first occurs, a worker or an employer may apply for mediation
within the enterprise. 8 If mediation fails, or if one of the parties
is unwilling to have the dispute mediated, one or both of the
parties may apply for labor arbitration." Labor arbitrations are
conducted by tripartite labor dispute arbitration committees
(laodong zhengyi zhongcai weiyuanhui, "LDACs"), established by
the local labor departments."3
The LDACs (of which there are close to 3,000)84 have very
wide jurisdiction on paper, extending to disputes over wages by
present and former employees."5 The LDACs also have broad
powers to rule on the validity of a contract, order reinstatement
of a terminated employee, order the payment of compensation,
or require employers to comply with labor contracts.8 6
More and more labor disputes are being brought before
LDACs. s7 According to statistics from the MOLSS, 8 the number
79. See Labor Law, art. 83.
80. See GUAN, supra note 32, at 531; ZHENG, supra note 78, at 146-49.
81. See Labor Law, art. 79; see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Laodong
Zhengyi Chuli Tiaoli [Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Settlement of
Labor Disputes in Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council, July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993) art. 6 [hereinafter Dispute Regulations].
82. See Labor Law, art. 79; Dispute Regulations, art. 6.
83. See Labor Law, art. 81; Dispute Regulations, art. 12.
84. There were 2934 in 2003. ZHONGGuo FALU NIANJIAN [LAw YEARBOOK OF
CHINA] 603 (2004).
85. Labor disputes are broadly defined to cover a range of matters in connection
with an employment relationship. See Dispute Regulations, art. 2. The labor dispute
procedure applies to disputes where a labor relationship has existed, notwithstanding
that no contract has been concluded. See Labor Disputes Interpretation, art. 1.
86. On the kinds of orders that LDACs make, see JOSEPHS, supra note 23, at 90-95.
87. See Ho, supra note 24, at 82-143 (setting forth a comprehensive analysis of labor dispute occurrence and types); see also Mary Gallagher, "Use the Law as Your
Weapon!":• InstitutionalChange and Legal Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN
CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 54, 67-70;
TmiREAu & HUA, supra note 50.
88. These statistics are not entirely reliable since the figures do not always tally
with each other. However, the MOLSS statistics probably do indicate general trends.
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of new cases has been increasing yearly, from 47,951 in 1996 to
226,391 in 2003, an increase of more than 470% in just seven
years. 89 Further, more than one third of all labor arbitrations
concern remuneration.9 0
However, LDACs frequently fail to resolve disputes. Although the statistics are inconsistent, it would seem that a majority of cases are appealed from arbitration. 91 One reason for this
appears to be that many LDACs reject cases because of an excessively narrow view of their jurisdiction-perhaps to lower their
workload by shifting cases to the courts-but the courts then
take them up. 9 2 Yet, even where LDACs acknowledge jurisdiction, parties to the dispute appeal a very high proportion of their
arbitral judgments.9"
The high rate of court applications suggests that the Chinese labor arbitration system has serious weaknesses. This impression is confirmed by the comprehensive critique of the system by Chinese labor law scholar, Zheng Shang-yuan.9 4 Professor
Zheng first observes that the present labor dispute resolution
processes were conceived in the era when the economy was
much more centrally planned and dominated by the State sector
than it is today. These processes remain highly bureaucratized
(xingzhenghua), with the labor departments as the central actors.9" The LDACs, while formally separate entities authorized
to "settle labor disputes independently according to law, "96 are
chaired by a labor department representative,9 7 located within
the labor dispute settlement section of the department,9 8 and
89. See ZHONCGGuO LAODONG TONGJI NL jiAN [YEARBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS]
2004, tbl.9-1.
90. See id. tbl.9-2 (indicated that, in 2003, 76,774 cases, or thirty-four percent of the
total number of labor arbitrations, involved remuneration and that sixty-five percent of
these cases came from the non-State sector).
91. See Ho, supra note 24, at 79.
92. See Gallagher, supra note 87, at 62; see also THIREAU & HUA, supra note 50, at 87.
93. See Gallagher, supra note 87, at 73 (reporting that officials in Beijing and
Shanghai indicated that in 2003 nearly seventy percent of all judgments were appealed).
94. See ZHENG, supra note 78.
95. See id. at 137-41.
96. Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Guize [Organic Rules of Labor
Dispute Arbitration Committees] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, Nov. 5, 1993,
effective Nov. 5, 1993), art. 2 [hereinafter LDAS Rules].
97. See Labor Law, art. 81; Dispute Regulations, art. 13.
98. See Dispute Regulations, art. 13.
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dependent on the department for administrative work. 99 Moreover, the LDACs do not have the status of legal persons, do not
have their own assets or control over their financial operations,
and cannot pay the wages and benefits of their members. This
means in effect that the full-time arbitrators must be employees
of the labor departments. 1'
Further, although LDACs are ostensibly based on the principle of tripartism and should be comprised of State, employer,
and employee representatives, in practice State representatives
dominate.'
We have just seen that the labor department representative is the chair of a LDAC. The "employer" representative
is nominated by government agencies responsible for administrating State-owned enterprises; 10 2 this means that despite the
growing private sector of the economy, there is no engagement
in the dispute resolution process by private employers. On the
other hand, the "employee" representative is drawn from the
quasi-governmental official trade union organization.10 3 In any
event, these "non-State" representatives may not be present in
many of these cases, which can be heard by individual arbitrators.10 4 Under these conditions, labor arbitration crosses over
into bureaucratic implementation of the law, rather than consti10 5
tuting an autonomous dispute resolution procedure.
A further problem is that LDAC arbitrators face strong incentives to be biased against employees. The law provides that
arbitrators must recuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest and prohibits them from taking bribes.10 6 However, LDACs
are often predisposed to favor local government and local business interests (often intertwined) to the detriment of individual
workers. 0 v This may be because of corrupt financial inducements, but the structural reason why LDACs would not wish to
offend local governments is that they are dependent on labor
departments for their resources and personnel, and those de99. See id.; LDAC Rules, art. 3.
100. See ZHENG, supra note 78, at 154; see also LDAC Rules, art. 15.
101. See ZHENG, supra note 78, at 150-53.
102. LDAC Rules, art. 7; see also ZHENG, supra note 78, at 151-52.
103. See LDAC Rules, art 7; see also ZHENG, supra note 78, at 153.
104. Union representatives were involved in only 30,396 of the cases in 2003.
ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 603 (2004).
105. See ZHENG, supra note 78, at 139.
106. See Dispute Regulations, arts. 35, 38.
107. See Gallagher, supra note 87, at 74.
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partments are, in turn, dependent on local governments for their
resources and personnel.
Finally, LDACs do not have jurisdiction where there is not
an employer-employee relationship. Chinese labor law does not
explain in detail how to identify such a relationship; this leaves
scope for the LDACs to determine the existence of these relationships for themselves. As mentioned above, many LDACs
take a very narrow view of their jurisdiction' 0 8 -perhaps to reduce their workload-and are therefore likely to dismiss cases
from workers who do not have a clearly identifiable employer.
These workers may be the most vulnerable to violations of their
contractual entitlements.
Turning from the status and composition of the LDACs to
questions of process, a first problem is that a party (usually the
employer) is able to draw out a dispute until the other party is
exhausted. 0 9 When a LDAC accepts an application, it has a
maximum of 104 days within which to conclude the case. " 0° This
in itself is a reasonable period. If one of the parties is dissatisfied
with the arbitral award, however, it can elect to commence court
proceedings, preventing the arbitrated award from taking ef11
fect. '
The court process involves a de novo hearing at first instance, and, if there is an appeal of the first instance judgment, a
second de novo hearing." 2 Professor Zheng points out that this
process places workers seeking to recover arrears in wages in a
highly disadvantageous position. First, they face the prospect of
maintaining legal proceedings without their primary source of
income (especially if they have been wrongly terminated).
Court proceedings are expensive, 1 13 and there is inadequate legal aid for persons without means, such as individual workers,
14
who wish to access lawyers.'
108. For example, they reject cases where there is a labor relationship without a
written contract. See supra note 92.
109. See ZHENG, supra note 78, at 201-04.
110. See Dispute Regulations, arts. 25, 32.
111. See Labor Dispute Interpretation, art. 17.
112. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of
the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Congress, Apr. 9, 1991), chs. XII-XIV
[hereafter Civil Procedure Law].
113. For more extensive accounts of the Chinese court system, see LUBMAN, supra
note 21, at 250-97, and PEERENBOOM, supra note 21, at 280-342.
114. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 21, at 362-64. On access to competent and hon-
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Second, workers run the risk of the employer absconding,
or removing assets from the jurisdiction.I15 In the case of court
proceedings, it is possible to obtain preventative orders, such as
orders to preserve property and evidence. 1 6 Most usefully, a
court can order interim relief, including, specifically, in cases involving labor remuneration. 1 7 Such orders cannot be made by
LDACs." 8
Not surprisingly, then, LDACs appear to be rarely used by
migrant workers. Research by Thireau and Hua of data at the
Shenzhen Labor Bureau suggests that LDACs are used to resolve
disputes by wealthier, long-term, and frequently skilled workers."' 9 Other research suggests that these workers are overwhelmingly well-resourced males. 12 On the other hand, poorer
workers use oral or written complaints submitted to the labor
department as their principle means of
trying to engage State
12 1
institutions to deal with labor abuses.
Even if a worker can sustain the expenses associated with an
arbitration or court proceeding, and obtains an order in her or
his favor, this may be of little avail. It is often very difficult in
China to execute either arbitral awards or court judgments. As
application for execution of arbitral awards involves court proceedings, in both cases the difficulty lies with the court compulsory execution process. It is well established that Chinese courts
122
are frequently unable to enforce their judgments.
Another procedural shortcoming is that the legal instruments regulating dispute resolution generally draw no procedural distinctions between individual and collective disputes. This
is a legacy of central planning, where industrial conflict did not
est lawyers, see Yuwen Li, Court Reform in China: Problems, Progressand Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 55, 61-62, 69,
and PEERENBOOM, supra note 21, at 361-69.
115. See ZHENG, supra note 78, at 167-70.
116. Civil Procedure Law, chs. VI, IX.
117. See id. arts. 97, 98.
118. ZHENG, supra note 78, at 166-70.
119. Thireau & Hua, supra note 50, at 90; see alsoJOSEPHS, supra note 23, at 92-94.
120. Hualing Fu & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication: Settling Labor Disputes
in China, 3 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 17, 18-19 (2004).
121. See Thireau & Hua, supra note 50, at 90.
122. See generally Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civiljudgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996); see alsoJianfu Chen, Mis-

sion Impossible: Judicial Efforts to Enforce CivilJudgments and Rulings, in IMPLEMENTATION
OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 21, at 85.
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take the same form as collective disputes in market-based economies. 12 3 This means that the LDACs use the same procedures
for a small individual dispute and a large-scale conflict that may
involve considerable economic and social disruption, for instance, where a factory suddenly closes, leaving thousands of
workers unpaid.
D. Enforcing the Rules: Unions
Shortcomings in labor bureaucracies and dispute procedures are, of course, observed in very many jurisdictions. Nonetheless, in many countries, the injurious effects such shortcomings have on workers are counteracted by workers' capacity to
pursue compliance issues collectively, through their unions. In
China, however, the extent to which lawful trade unions are responsible for compelling compliance with the law is determined
by the State, not by ordinary union members. The compliance
function of Chinese unions is thus really another aspect of State
bureaucratic enforcement of labor law. It is worth while to examine how far this compliance function contributes to the implementation of labor law.
China's official trade union organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions ("ACFU"), is the largest "labor organization" in the world, claiming a membership of over 130 million,
more than 300,000 full time officials, and more than one and a
half million base-level (that is, enterprise) unions.14 The
ACFTU, however, is not an organization controlled by its membership. It is subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party
("CCP") and the State. 125 This arrangement is spelled out both
1 27
in the Trade Union Law 12 6 and in the ACFTU Charter.
It is well known that China does not permit unions to be
formed without ACFTU approval 12 and has harshly punished
123. See ZHENG, supra note 78, at 141-46, 207-16.
124. See All-China Federation of Trade Unions ("ACFTU") Website, http://www.
acftu.org.cn/about.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
125. See, e.g., TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 74, at 40-43, 102-23.

126. Amended Trade Union Law of the P.R.C. (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the Nat'l People's Congress on Amending the Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China, Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001), art. 4 [hereinafter
Trade Union Law].
127. Charter of Chinese Unions, passed by the 14th National Congress of the
ACFTU on September 26, 2003 [hereinafter the Charter].
128. Trade Union Law, art. 11.
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labor activists who have attempted such actions. 29 This clearly
violates the key ILO conventions on freedom of association, 3 0 as
the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has repeatedly
found.' 3 ' Despite this, there is very little prospect that China will
substantially alter its stance on freedom of association in the
short to medium term as the party-State sees dominance of labor
13 2
organizations as essential to its survival.
The Trade Union Law, then, binds Chinese trade unions to
the CCP and the State through the ACFTU structure and treats
worker representative bodies outside this structure as illegal.
Moreover, the law goes beyond simply ensuring that the CCP/
State has ultimate authority over trade unions; it directs the
functions unions are to perform. It treats them essentially as
State regulatory agencies.
Among these mandated functions, a major responsibility of
the trade unions is to seek employer compliance with the Labor
Law. The 2001 amendments to the Trade Union Law delineate
specifically that trade unions are obligated to (yingdang) take action "on behalf of employees" where enterprises misappropriate
wages. 133
These provisions suggest that, while Chinese trade unions
may not be worker-representative organizations as understood in
liberal democratic societies, they are nevertheless well positioned to protect worker entitlements where these are set out in
the law. Indeed, they are directed to do so.134 Importantly, seeing that labor law is properly implemented does not, on its face,
put unions in tension with the party-State.
In principle, official Chinese trade unions could be a much
more effective force for securing compliance than labor department inspectors. According to official data, union officials out129. See International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU Comments on the
First Report Submitted by the People's Republic of China in its Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 1966, app. 3 (2005).
130. See, e.g., Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention
(ILO No 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N. T.S. 17; Right to Organize and Collective BargainingConvention (ILO No 98),July 1, 1949, 96 UN T.S. 257.
131. See, e.g., ILO Committee on Freedom of Association Reports Vol. LXXXVI,
2003, Series B, No. 1, paras. 385-467, 465.
132. See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 128-45 (1999)

(discussing the interaction between China and the ILO on freedom of association).
133. Trade Union Law, arts. (1)-(2).
134. See Labor Law, art. 7.
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number inspectors by more than seven to one, and, unlike labor
inspectors, officials of base-level unions are located5 within ?nterprises and so can conduct ongoing monitoring.'3
Unfortunately, for many reasons, the compliance function
of Chinese unions remains weak. First, the legal powers available
to a union to compel an employer to adhere to the law are inadequate. Where a union identifies a violation of the law, it has no
direct remedy against the employer. Its power is essentially limited to raising the issue with the employer and seeking its response.19 6 The union has no substantive legal or industrial
weapon at its disposal. It is dependent on other agencies to apply legal sanctions or issue binding orders-in most cases either
the labor inspectorate. 3 7 or a LDAC."3 ' As already demonstrated, these agencies have problems of their own.
As for industrial sanctions, there is no right to strike in
China, even when there is a life-endangering hazard in the enterprise. 3 9 Where industrial action occurs in an enterprise, the
union is required to "express the employee's views, negotiate
with the employer and propose a resolution"-it cannot lead a
stoppage but, on the contrary, is enjoined to help the enterprise
"resume production as quickly as possible" and "restore work discipline."14 °
Second, many enterprise level unions are dominated by
management.14 1 Indeed, union officials may themselves be enterprise managers. 4 2 This is clearly in conflict with the ILO
principles on preventing interference with union autonomy' 4 3 as
well as with the situation in most industrialized countries, where
legislation or the internal rules of unions prevent management
dominance of unions.
135. Cf statistics supra notes 75, 124 and accompanying text.
136, Trade Union Law, art. 22.
137. See id.
138. See id. arts. 20-21.
139. See id. art. 24. A union may only suggest to the employer that work cease.
140. Id. art. 27. Union officials frequently seek actively to prevent or defuse industrial action on the basis of the "national interest." Feng Chen, Between the State and Labor:
The Conflict of Chinese Trade Unions'DoubleIdentity in Market Reform, 176 CHINA Q. 1006,
1018-22 (2003).
141. For the historical reasons for this, see, e.g., TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 74, at
103-07.
142. See Gallagher, supra note 38, at 26-28, 32-33; Simon Clarke et al., Collective
Consultation and Industrial Relations in China, 42 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 235, 24144 (2004).
143. Right to Organize and Collective BargainingConvention, supra note 130, art. 2.
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In the context of enforcement of Labor Law, it is obvious
that a manager in a firm that has breached obligations to its employees will be tempted to prevent a union taking action against
the firm or assisting a worker to take such action. If the firm
manager is also the union secretary, then union support for enforcement proceedings is unlikely to be forthcoming. 4 4 Observation confirms this; in many wage arrears cases, for example,
the union official has actively represented management in arbitration proceedings. 4' 5
The 2001 revisions of the Trade Union Law state that "close
relatives of those chiefly responsible for running a firm" (qiye
zhuyao fuzeren) cannot be candidates for election to union committees at enterprise union level. 1 46 Crucially, however, the Law
does not prevent managers themselves being elected.
Third, there are limited means through which members can
compel their unions to protect their entitlements or to represent
them, as the law requires. The Trade Union Law obliges unions
to assist individual workers who commence proceedings in a
LDAC or in the courts. 1 4 7 One of the important revisions to the
Trade Union Law made in 2001 was to confer an express right
on trade unions to litigate directly when an employer violates a
collective contract. 4 The relevant union can take the employer
149
to a LDAC and then to court.
There are many disputes in which unions do in fact assist
workers. 5 ' Nevertheless, there are many other circumstances
(apart from straightforward management domination) in which
the unions decline to help, especially if facts are disputed or
there is a large collective dispute. As Feng Chen has pointed
out, when it occurs, the involvement of unions in compliance
issues tends to be case-based rather than focusing on underlying
144. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 74, at 127 (reporting from their fieldwork that
in some localities, the ACFTU has agreed to allow private firm managers to appoint the
union chairperson because of pressure applied by local government authorities).
145. See Greenfield & Pringle, supra note 10, at 36; see also Ching Kwan Lee, From
Organized Dependence to DisorganizedDespotism: Changing Labour Relations in Chinese Factories, 157 CHINA Q. 44, 58 (1999).
146. Trade Union Law, art. 9.
147. See id. art. 21.
148. See id. arts. 20, 49.
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 140, at 1012-17.
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151
structural issues that lead to abuses becoming endemic.
Fourth, when Chinese unions do attempt to assist workers,
their efforts have not been directed to those workers who suffer
the most egregious violations of the law. Either unions are not
present in those enterprises where the worst violations occur, or
they fail to include the worst affected workers. Despite the apparently large number of union members and union officials, at
best only around thirty percent of private enterprises are unionized,' 5 2 and even in the unionized firms, the union structures
53
often exist only on paper.'
Of still more consequence, the ACFTU, until very recently,
did not attempt to represent or act in the interests of migrant
workers at all. Migrant workers, being from rural areas, were
classified as agricultural workers (nongmingong) and therefore
not part of the "working class" participating in the union. Chinese unions have focused on representing urban workers with
long-term contracts; such workers generally enjoy much better
working conditions than migrant workers.' 5 4
The union position has now changed, at least in a formal
sense. In 2003, the ACFTU issued a circular stipulating that all
migrant workers are entitled to join trade unions, irrespective of
their residence status or their work experience. 55 Since then,
the organization has issued further notices, actively encouraging
its constituent unions to recruit migrant workers.1 5 6 There is,
however, little firm evidence of large scale migrant worker involvement in the running of Chinese unions.
151. See id. at 1017.
152. See Kai Chang, Collective Bargaining: Problems and Solutions, 11 INT'L UNION
RTS. 3, 4 (2004). See generally Daniel Ding et al., The Impact of Economic Reform on the Role
of Trade Unions in Chinese Enterprises, 13 INT'LJ. HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. 431 (2002). On
the conduct of unions in various kinds of private sector firms, see Gallagher, supra note
38, at 26-31.
153. See Chen, supra note 140, at 1025 (discussing the top-down approach to organizing taken by the ACFFU); see also Ding et al., supra note 152, at 445-46.
154. Local surveys indicated that very few migrant workers participated in unions
prior to the 2003 policy change. SeeJiu MingongJiaru Gonghui, LaodongBumen Ying Ti
Mingong Shuohua, WANFANG DUSHI BAO, Mar. 14, 2003 (reporting survey commissioned
by firms in Shenzhen).
155. Union Accepts Migrant Workers, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 3, 2003, http://www.china
daily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-09/03/content_260707.htm (last visted Mar. 7, 2007).
156. See, e.g., Guanyu Zuzhi Gezhong Suoyouzhi, Shiye Danwei Ji Jiguan de
LaowugongJiaru Gonghui de Tongzhi [Notice on Organizing Laborers to Join Unions
in Business Enterprises with All Kinds of Ownership Structures, and Non-profit Enterprises Organs] Oct. 30, 2004.
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E. Towards a More Comprehensive Response
to Underpayment of Wages?
Chinese labor law's internal defects seem to provide little
hope that it will steer workplaces away from abusive practices.
Still, an overly pessimistic conclusion is not justified: There is a
high degree of dynamism in the process of legal reform in
China. This opens up sites for progressive intervention, so that
certain useful changes to the law may be feasible. Two important legal initiatives illustrate these possibilities.
1. The Draft Labor Contract Law
On March 20, 2006, the National People's Congress released a draft Labor Contract Law," 7 which expands the legal
rights of employees in several significant respects. In particular,
it goes a long way towards addressing four of the major gaps in
the labor law framework identified above. First, the draft sets
out a number of contractual principles dealing with interpretation, variation, the effect of work performed under invalid contracts, and the effect of contractual relations following transfer
or restructuring of business.1 58 As noted above, these matters
are not addressed in the current Labor Law, nor can they be
regulated by the general Contract Law. 59
Second, the draft law tackles one aspect of the "boundary"
problem 60 encountered in contemporary employment relations-the position where workers are "dispatched" (paiqian) or
transferred between firms. 6 ' Third, the law clarifies the circumstances in which deductions can be made from wages. Articles
11, 26, and 31 are the key provisions. Article 11 prohibits an
157. Labor Contract Law (draft) (Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 20, 2006) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Draft Labor Contract Law]. A revised draft was released in December
2006. See Vote on Labour Contract Law Put Off CHINA DAILY, Dec. 27, 2006, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/27/content 768327.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
The provisions cited here refer to the revised draft.
158. See Draft Labor Contract Law, art. 8 (interpretation in favor of employee in
cases of ambiguity); see also id. arts. 27-29 (validity and effect of work performed under
invalid contracts); id. arts. 34-35 (transfer of business); id. art. 36 (variation). The law
also includes provisions dealing with matters including staff and union consultation
over firm policies, and termination of the contract through frustration, mass redundancy and other circumstances.
159. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part II.A.3.
161. Draft Labor Contract Law, ch. 5, § 2.
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employer from requiring a worker to pay a bond, from receiving
a worker's property as a bond, and from retaining a worker's
residence permit or other identity papers. Article 26 prohibits
an employer from including a term in an employment contract
requiring an employee to pay a fine for breaching the contract. 162 An employer who contravenes these provisions can be
directed by the labor bureau to return any property wrongly acquired and to pay a fine of between 500 and 2000 yuan per
worker. 16 An employee is entitled to compensation for any loss
caused by the employer's breach of these provisions.' 6 4 There

are also new penalty provisions for employers who fail to pay
wages on time. 165 Fourth, Article 31 of the revised draft appears
to enable a worker to sue for wage arrears in a court, without
first proceeding through labor arbitration.
The draft law still has significant shortcomings-in particular it fails to address many systemic problems with enforcement
mechanisms discussed above. 166 Furthermore, it is not clear
whether the provisions on wages will be watered down when it is
finally enacted by the National People's Congress or its Standing
Committee. Nonetheless, the draft demonstrates that there are
serious attempts, at the highest level of Chinese government, to
respond to the lacunae in the system of legal rules governing
payment, and to respond in a way that increases the legal rights
of workers.
2. The Guangdong Wage Regulations
The second example concerns a law that is actually in force,
albeit at the provincial level. This illustrates that, paradoxically,
one of the apparent difficulties with the Chinese system of labor
162. There are two exceptions: an employer may under certain circumstances recover training expenses, and an employer may include a restraint of trade clause in a
contract specifying a financial penalty for breach. See id. arts. 23-24.
163. Id. art. 84.
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 85.
166. See David Barboza, China Drafts Law to Empower Unions and End Labor Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at Al. The draft has been the subject of vigorous international debate between labor activists and major corporations. See, e.g., GLORAL LABOR
STRATEGIES, UNDUE INFLUENCE:

CORPORATIONS GAIN GROUND IN BATTLE OVER CHINA'S

NEw LABOR LAw (March 2007), available at http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global-labor.strategies/files/undue-influence-global-laborstrategies.pdf.
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regulation-its jurisdictional fragmentation-can in fact lead to
productive innovation.
While national legislators have been moving towards a new
labor contract law, several provincial and municipal governments have already improved the regulatory framework dealing
with underpayment of wages. One of the most comprehensive
efforts came into effect at the beginning of 2005. The
Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages (the
"Guangdong Wage Regulations") bring together in one well-ordered document many of the principles on wage determination
and wage enforcement scattered in various national and local
legal materials. 6 7 Compared to the draft Labor Contract Law,
the Guangdong Wage Regulations are much more specific, and
are more creative and sophisticated, especially in the way they
approach compliance with the law.
The Guangdong Wage Regulations clarify the method of determining wages,16 8 the form in which, and the person to whom,
they must be paid, 6 ' and the relationship between wages and
individual and collective contracts. 17 ' They stipulate the method
of calculating the minimum wage and penalty rates, including
for the rates for piecework.' 7 ' The Guangdong Wage Regulations establish the entitlement to wages in the event of work
72 when
stoppages, 172
there has been a wrongful termination, 1
and when a worker takes various forms of leave. 1 74 They also
ensure that workers will receive remuneration when they are engaged in representational activities 171 (such as work for the
union or workers congresses, and participation in the negotiation of collective contracts).
In relation to the vague terms in the Labor Law examined
above ("misappropriation" and "payment in arrears withoutjustification"), the Guangdong Wage Regulations indicate which
types of deductions are lawful and which types of deductions
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See Guandong Wage Regulations, supra note 42.
See id. art. 54.
See id. arts. 10-11.
See id. arts. 8-9.
See id. arts. 4, 8, 10, 18, 20-22.
See id. art. 35.
See id. arts. 13, 29.
See id. arts. 12, 19, 24-25.
See id. art. 26.
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constitute misappropriation. 6 Unfortunately, though, unlike
the draft national labor contract law, they do not state categorically that the payment of a bond on commencement of employment is unlawful.' 7 7

While the systematic stipulation of key rules on remuneration is a very significant advance on the fragmentary state of the
law at the national level, the most important aspect of the
Guangdong Wage Regulations is their treatment of enforcement
and compliance. The Guangdong Wage Regulations include a
number of provisions that strengthen the enforcement process.
First, firms are required to implement their own compliance systems. 178 All firms must establish and make public to
their workforce a wages scheme that indicates how wages are determined and varied, when they are to be paid, how overtime is
to be paid, and which deductions may lawfully be made.' 7 9 Individual workers are entitled to be informed of the content of the
scheme."' ° Firms must also keep detailed records on wages for
two years. The records must indicate matters such as wages paid,
how the wages are related to time worked, and any deductions
made.'
Individual workers receive their own pay slips that
must be consistent with the general firm records. 8 2 In the event
of any dispute, the onus is on the employer to show that he or
she has produced these records; if the employer does 3not pro8
duce them, employees may be deemed to be unpaid.
Second, the Guangdong Wage Regulations broaden legal liability for wages to employers who might otherwise escape responsibility through interposing other legal entities; thus liability
for wages may extend to individual partners of insolvent partnerships,' 8 4 head contractors in building projects,' 8 5 and successor
firms following merger or division.1 8 6 This goes some way to176.
177.
tions.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. arts. 10, 14-15.
Compare Draft Labor Contract Law, art. 11, with Guangdong Wage RegulaGuandong Wage Regulations, art. 7.
See id.
See id.
See id. art. 16.
See id. art. 17.
See id. arts. 17, 44.
See id. art. 30.
See id. art. 33.
See id. art. 34.
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wards addressing the
failure in the Labor Law to deal with
18 7
"boundary" issues.
Third, the Regulations set up a public warning system for
firms significantly in arrears. as The labor department can notify
the public of the firm's poor record through the media, at employment agencies, and by notices in the firm itself.1 89 Fourth, a
firm's legal representative (such as the general manager or head
of the board of directors) can be personally fined for a firm's
non-compliance with the regulations. This is the case, for example, when a wages scheme is not established, records are not
kept,1 90 or when industrial conflict breaks out and the manager
fails to attend on the spot within twenty-four hours.' 9 ' If the
conflict arises because a firm has attempted to relocate in order
to avoid paying wages, the legal representative can be detained
by the public security bureau or arrested.' 9 2
The Guangdong Wage Regulations indicate that it is possible to develop clear substantive norms regulating remuneration
in a systematic manner. They also deploy compliance strategies
that are far more sophisticated than those in the national law.
The critical question is of course how well this important initiative will operate in practice. It is too early to know.
III. PROSPECTS FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION
Despite progressive initiatives such as the draft Labor Contract Law and the Guangdong Wage Regulations, the overall impression from this analysis is that there are very serious flaws in
the law relating to payment of wages and in the implementation
of that law. Some of these problems are specific to labor law
(such as the labor disputes system and the peculiar legal status of
Chinese trade unions), while others concern the legal system as
a whole (such as the disorderly state of legal norms, local bureaucratic corruption, and the difficulties with enforcing court
judgments).
One way in which researchers outside China might contribute to improving the formulation of and compliance with the
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Part II.A.3.
Guangdong Wage Regulations, arts. 37, 41.
See id.
See id. art. 48.
See id. art. 51.
See id.
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labor law is to draw on their own societies' experience of regulatory implementation, to the extent that those experiences are
relevant in the Chinese context. The next part of this Article
begins with a discussion of the relative strengths of different regulatory approaches in the Chinese context and then offers a
number of reform proposals.
A. Alternative Regulatory Approaches
China's approach to formal (or State-based) regulation in
general, and to labor regulation in particular, heavily favors
"command and control" methods. For several decades now,
command and control approaches have been severely criticized
in the regulatory literature of industrialized societies.193 Command and control is premised on the ability of a regulator to
craft rules and enforcement mechanisms, which both address in
a comprehensive manner the social problem that prompted the
regulatory intervention and foresee and avert the potential adverse effects of the intervention itself.' 9 4 The complexity of social relations and the scarce resources available to regulatory
agencies make this frequently unachievable. Consequently,
command and control regulation often tends towards excessive
bureaucratization and legalism, and resistance by the regulatory
target, 9 5 although as stated below, there are some circumstances
in which it may still be the preferable strategy.
Furthermore, many studies demonstrate that the "command" is very often transformed when it is placed in the hands
of officers in regulatory agencies. The agencies' interpretation
of the legal rules they enforce is refracted through their own
systems of values and practices, 19 6 which affect matters such as
the priority accorded to remedying different kinds of violations,
and the nature of the sanction deployed.1 97 It follows that the
practical implementation of legal rules by regulatory agencies
193. See, e.g.,

EUGENE BARDACH

&

ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:

THE PROB-

(1982).
194. See Winston Harrington & Richard D. Morgenstern, Economic Incentives Versus
Command and Control, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 13, 13 (Fall/lWinter 2004), http://
www. rff. org/Documents/RFF_Resources_ 52_ecoincentives. pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2007).
195. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Donald R. Harris et al., eds., 1992).
196. See id. at 19.
197. See id. at 35-38.
LEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS
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can depart far from what the original drafters of the legal rules
intended. 198
In response to these adverse effects, many scholars, including some in the field of labor law, have described a range of
complementary and alternative regulatory approaches. These
approaches have frequently proved superior to command and
control in practice.' 9 9 They have involved efforts to make law
more "responsive ' ° or "reflexive,''2° 1 enlisting the co-operation
of those subject to the law through establishing connections with
their own frames of reference, or radically reconfiguring legal
institutions on democratic experimentalist lines.2 °2 One common theme in these approaches is the coordinated "decentering"20 of responsibility for both the creation of regulatory
norms and their implementation to multiple actors (including
especially local non-State actors), albeit usually with oversight
from and accountability to governmental institutions
("metaregulation"). In some instances, the literature attempts
to integrate "corporate social responsibility" initiatives into regulatory frameworks, although these initiatives have also elicited
considerable skepticism.20 4
A second theme is the encouragement of local democratic
deliberation-the participation of those most affected by the social problem that calls for a regulatory response. A third theme
is an emphasis on local experimentation in the development of
responses to social problems, which, when monitored and evalu198. See, e.g., KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT (John C. Boal et al.,
eds., 1987); see also John Paterson & Gunther Teubner, Changing Maps: Empirical Legal
Autopoiesis, 7 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 451, 455 (1998).
199. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 195; CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN
CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002); Michael Dorf &
Charles Sabel, A Constitutionof DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);
Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & Soc. REV.
239 (1983). In the area of labor law, see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005), and Orly Lobel,
OrchestratedExperimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101 MICH. L. REV 2146 (2003).
200. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 195.
201. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 199.
202. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 199.
203. Julia Black, DecenteringRegulation: Understandingthe Role of Regulation and Selfregulation in a Post-regulatingWorld, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 106-11 (2001). For a
related analysis in the field of labor law, see Mark Barenberg, Labor Federalism in the
United States: Lessons for InternationalLabor Rights, 2001 J. INT'L ECON. L. 303 (2000).
204. Sean Cooney, A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in EradicatingForeign Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, 308-14 (2004).
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ated, yields a dynamic learning process that generates ongoing
improvements in regulatory norms and mechanisms.
B. The Feasibility of Alternative Regulatory Approaches in China
While alternative regulatory approaches offer a way to escape the pitfalls of command and control, it is doubtful how far
they can be applied in the Chinese context. Randy Peerenboom
cites many serious obstacles to alternative regulatory approaches
(in particular to democratic experimentalism) in China. The list
is formidable: the adherence to democratic centralism; the absence of strong, autonomous, civil society organizations and the
lack of independent vehicles for diffusing and critiquing information; low education and literacy levels; the likely hostility of
the bureaucracy to alternative approaches; the likely resistance
of local governmental institutions to requirements of information disclosure and external monitoring and evaluation (vital to
the effectiveness of those approaches); the prevalence of corruption among both State and private actors; widespread intolerance of diverse viewpoints, inhibiting reasoned deliberation; and
weak judicial institutions.20 5
While Peerenboom is writing in general terms about the
Chinese regulatory environment, analysis in this Article confirms
that the obstacles he identifies are present in an acute form in
the field of work relations. This suggests that reflexive strategies
for regulating labor relations in Chinese firms will be difficult to
implement. The civil society organizations most relevant to
more participatory forms of workplace regulation-organizations of working people-are either subordinate to the partyState, top-driven and frequently aligned with management, or
actively suppressed. Moreover, as has been shown, the lawful
worker organizations have, at least until very recently, done very

little to give voice to migrant workers-the socially and economically marginalized people whom Chinese labor law is most deficient in assisting. Migrant workers' low educational levels and
social status often leave them unwilling and unable to articulate
their concerns; unless they receive institutional support, they will
not be able to contribute to local regulatory processes.
Overall, circumstances are not very promising for new approaches displacing the current command and control mode of
205.

PEERENBOOM,

supra note 21, at 428-31.
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regulation. Norm-setting and enforcement will continue to be
focused on State agencies. That said, there is still some scope for
regulatory experimentation and decentralization. This scope is
fairly wide within the State apparatus. In the post-1978 period,
China has frequently taken an incremental, localized, and experimental approach to economic and social reform.2 0 6 This approach has extended to labor regulation: There have been rolling improvements in legal norms and enforcement strategies, as
the Guangdong Wage Regulations (themselves the product of
experimentation at the local municipal level) 20 7 illustrate. To be
sure, these initiatives do not devolve regulatory power away from
State entities (although they do shift it from the central government). They do not involve affected citizens in collaborative
problem-solving (other than through "their" quasi-State organization, the ACFTU).2°8 They mainly consist of a series of commands coupled with punishments (although they try to prompt
firms to build internal compliance systems). Their profusion
also makes the Chinese legal landscape unstable and complex.
Despite all this, Chinese norm-making practice is a relatively
nimble form of coordinated decentralization (especially when
compared to law-making in major federal systems). It has enabled the ongoing revision of labor norms and processes and the
simultaneous trial of a diverse range of regulatory innovations.
It has given law some prospect of responding to the accelerating
changes in, and the diversification of, Chinese work relations.
Moreover, even non-State initiatives experience some success.
Many Chinese workplaces are affected by decentered forms of
regulation, particular those associated with "corporate social responsibility" initiatives in global supply chains.20 9 Many of these
are plagued by disingenuous compliance and false information
flows.2"' As discussed further below, however, not all of these
initiatives fail.
206. See id. at 427-28.
207. John Chen, Wage Arrears Fuel Discontent, CHINA LAB. BULL., Aug. 31, 2002,
http://www.clb.org.hk/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=18557&item%5fid=
2110 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
208. Id.
209. See WORLD BANK GROUP, STRENGTHENING IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE SoCIAL REsPONSIBILITY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHINS (Oct. 2003), http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTPSD/Resources/CSR/Strengthening-Implementatio.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
210. See id. at 20.
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In sum, labor reform proposals need to recognize that the
basic "command and control" orientation of labor regulation
will persist in China. Within that orientation, there is some possibility for experimenting and for integrating insights from alternative regulatory approaches in order to construct more sophisticated labor enforcement strategies. Wholesale adoption of decentralized, participative, approaches, however, is not viable
while corruption is endemic and worker organizations are subverted by democratic centralism and management interference.
C. Some Suggestions
The following suggestions aim to improve compliance with
labor law, particularly the entitlement of workers to be paid for
their services. They assume that there is no impending radical
change to China's regulatory practices. They seek to recognize
and respond to the limitations of those practices, and to the
wider political, economic, and social contexts of Chinese work
relations.
1. Clarification of Key Norms
Basic labor law norms need to be clarified through the enactment of further legislation on labor contracts and wages.
There are grounds for optimism on this point. As shown, the
legislative amendment process is already well advanced both at
the national and the provincial level.
A more challenging task for legal norm-creation is the need
to address new forms of working relationships that cannot easily
be accommodated within the labor contract/contract for services divide. The ideological insistence that a labor contract is
radically different from other forms of contracting, although admirable in seeking to avoid the commoditization of labor, does
not assist in practice. Decentralized legislative experiments are
needed to develop ways of assisting dependent workers, who do
not fall clearly within the present definition of employee, or
where the identity of the employer is uncertain. Such experiments will also allow for greater responsiveness to local conditions (and industry structure).
The provisions in the
Guangdong Wage Regulations addressing construction sites provide examples of how innovation may be achieved.2
211. See Guangdong Wage Regulations, arts. 33-34.
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2. More Effective Sanctions
A number of fairly obvious changes to the institutions responsible for implementing the laws are needed. One line of
reforms would be to increase the enforcement powers of the labor bureaucracy and the quasi-State agency, the ACF[U. As
noted above, these are quite weak and fail to outweigh economic
incentives to flout the law. The suggestion is controversial. It is
a classic "command and control" response to a regulatory problem, and may perpetuate the pathologies associated with the bureaucratic mentality. Even worse, increasing sanctions available
to Chinese State agencies, notorious for abuse of discretionary
power (not least against labor activists), may be viewed by many
as retrograde.
Nonetheless, at least in the context of the abuse this Article
examines, bolstering enforcement powers is defensible and indeed desirable. As many regulatory scholars acknowledge, despite the undoubted deficiencies of command and control approaches, there are circumstances in which the specification of a
clear standard accompanied by an effective penalty is appropriate.2 1 2 This may be so where a regulated firm is persistently recalcitrant and failing to correct its deficiencies, even though it is
clearly feasible for it to do so. The case for a heavy-handed approach strengthens where a firm's actions cause considerable
suffering, as in occupational health and safety breaches.2 1 3 The
persistent and willful failure to pay wages due, or to require large
bonds, falls into this category.
At present, the strongest weapon in the labor department's
armory is the issuing of fines, which are often difficult to collect 214 and they are not sufficient to induce many firms to prevent arrears. It is true that labor departments can refer matters
to other State agencies for tougher penalties (such as the police), but those other State agencies will often not be familiar
with the principles governing labor relations. Moreover, there is
212. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKy, SMART REGULATION:
ING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 41-42 (Keith Hawkins et al., eds., 1998).
213.

DESIGN-

NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY:

183-291 (1999).
214. See Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
Labor and Social Security in China, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, 2002, available at http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/; see also AM. CTR. FOR INT'L LABOR SOLIDARITY, THE SOLIDARITY
CTR., JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS RIGHTS IN CHINA 38 (2004).
SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS
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a need for sanctions intermediate between a mere fine (in the
case of the labor department) and imprisonment (in the case of
the police).
One way to increase the powers of the labor bureaucracy
would be to enable them to suspend an individual employer's
business licenses, until the law is complied with. This is a penalty
wielded by other administrative agencies. 2 1 5 This power could
be exercised in the more serious circumstances of unpaid wages
or the imposition of bonds, where command and control strategies are likely to be more effective.
The best way for labor departments to deploy increased
powers (and to prevent their abuse) is to ensure they are integrated into a comprehensive and systematic enforcement strategy. Professors Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite's concept of the
"enforcement pyramid" is relevant here. 2 16 Low-cost enforcement strategies such as persuasion and warning are more easily
deployed against non-compliant firms in the first instance, but
where they are met with defiance, the enforcement agency needs
to be able to threaten a range of sanctions of varying severity.
Firms, knowing that regulatory agencies can impose credible
and effective penalties, will then take their advice and warning
217
more seriously.
Labor departments cannot, at present, escalate up the enforcement pyramid to suspending an employer's entitlement to
operate a business.2 " This undermines the effective use of even
those weak sanctions they already have.
3. Improving Dispute Resolution
Labor dispute resolution institutions also need major revision, along the lines proposed by Professor Zheng 1 9 and many
other Chinese scholars. 2 2' First, the requirement that arbitration always precede litigation should be abolished, especially
when a worker simply wishes to recover outstanding wages. Sec215. See Administrative Punishments Law, art. 8(4).
216. AYREs & BRA1THWAITE, supra note 195, at 35-38.
217. See id. at 36.
218. See Labor Law, art. 91.
219. ZHENG, supra note 78, at 179-222.
220. The support for these ideas was evident from the participants (leading Chinese Labor Law scholars and labor officials) in the International Seminar on Labor
Dispute Resolution, held at Peking University Law School from November 19-21, 2004.
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ond, LDACs would benefit from greater institutional independence from the labor bureau and from better-trained personnel.
Third, more specific procedures for different kinds of labor
disputes (rights/interest, collective/individual) seem appropriate, and greater powers to assist workers left without income as a
result of lengthy dispute resolution proceedings. The procedural
rules should also enable LDACs to grant interim relief. Fourth,
the scope of "labor dispute" should be broadly interpreted to
cover sub-contracting arrangements that involve dependent labor (who may not technically be employees). One possibility
would be to enable LDACS to entertain disputes between independent contractors in certain circumstances, as occurs with
"unfair contract" legislation in several international jurisdictions.2 2 1
4. Trade Union Reform
If China observed ILO conventions on the right to organize
and to bargain collectively, compliance with labor law would almost certainly improve. Under present political circumstances,
however, it is unrealistic to think that China is prepared to do
this.2 22 Nevertheless, if Chinese unions cannot lawfully become
fully autonomous worker organizations, they can at least become
more effective compliance agencies. There are several ways in
which this could occur.
First, unions should have the power to direct workers to
cease production under certain conditions. This would in effect
confer a power on unions to call a strike, albeit one that could
be formulated to be linked to the enforcement of State law and
not constitute a challenge to government policy on public unrest. In any event, strikes over existing entitlements occur on an
informal basis very frequently. 223 This change would provide a
means of both legitimizing and regulating them.
A further crucial move would be to render Chinese trade
unions more independent from firm management, especially in
the private sector. Ideally, the Trade Union Law would be
221. See, e.g., Industrial Relations Act (New South Wales), pt. 9 (1996).
222. See generally Toby D. Merchant, Recognizing ILO Rights to Organize and Bargain
Collectively: Grease in China's Transition to a Socialist Market Economy, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 223, 236-53 (2004).
223. See id. at 224, 235.
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amended to require this; but internal measures within the
ACFTU, such as directives from higher-level union bodies to
grassroots unions located in firms, may be just as effective if
done systematically. Higher-level unions, could, for example,
systematically refuse to affirm (pizhun) the election of firm managers to trade union offices at grass root level.
Even if these measures were adopted, they would not assist
the most vulnerable workers unless the ACFTU is able to mobilize its enterprise unions to take up the issues of migrant workers.
There is no longer a structural obstacle to this within the organization.224 Moreover, at a rhetorical level, the ACFTU appears
22 5
committed to renouncing its previous exclusionary practices.
Yet, it will take a considerable change in the mentality of local
union cadres (overwhelmingly drawn from among the more
privileged urban employees with their prejudices against migrant workers) to give practical effect to this.
If, on the other hand, the organization fails to confront the
reality of oppressive management treatment of workers in many
private firms and persists with its "mediating" approach to dispute resolution, it will be, at best, irrelevant to those workers.
5. Coordination between State and Private Sector Initiatives
In addition to improving individual State-based compliance
mechanisms, there needs to be greater coordination between
those mechanisms and private sector initiatives (self-regulatory
measures). While Chinese civil society is tightly controlled, and
firms are resistant to notions of corporate social responsibility,
there are nevertheless many significant private sector attempts to
improve labor conditions, including ensuring that workers are
paid for work performed. 226 Major sources of these private sector initiatives are multinational corporations whose supply
chains are anchored in China.2 27 Under often intense consumer
224. See Ronald C. Brown, China's Collective ContractProvisions: Can Collective Negotiations Embody Collective Bargaining?,16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 37-46 (2006).
225. See id. at 52; see also ACFTU, Constitution of the Trade Unions of the People's
Republic of China, General Principles, 1998, http://www.Acftu.org.cn/constitu.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
226. See HILARY MURDOCH & DANIEL GOULD, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
CHINA:

MAPPING THE ENVIRONMENT, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR WORKERS AND COMMUNITIES

63-71 (2004).
227. See Benedict Rogers, Supply Chain Crucialto Boosting Profits, HONG KONG IMAIL
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pressure, many multinational corporations have attempted to require their subcontractors to improve working conditions. 228
Many of these private sector initiatives fail in the face of perfunctory and disingenuous participation by sub-contractors, lack of
participation by the affected workers, and an unwillingness or
inability of multinational corporations to establish effective monitoring and compliance systems.2 29 Nonetheless, multinational
firms are continually reworking their initiatives in the face of
criticism, and have occasionally come up with credible and creative compliance strategies, especially where they collaborate with
multi-stakeholder groups such as the Ethical Trade Initiative or
230

SA8000.

It is not only multinational firms that are devising methods
of raising compliance with labor law. An increasing number of
actors outside the labor bureaucracy and the ACFTU are attempting to improve Chinese working conditions. 23' These include groups with links to non-government organizations (particularly in Hong Kong) ,232 free-standing research and training
institutes, 23 3 advisory services associated with Chinese universities, 234 some parts of the All China Women's Federation 2 35 and
some individual Chinese firms. 236 Even the Chinese government, at both the national and provincial levels, is now promotEMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE (May 10, 2001); Dressed for Success: Global Trade Manage-

ment Technology is a Good Fit for Liz Claiborne, LoGiSTIcs TODAY, June 1, 2005, at 1.
228. In any case, the author agrees with Liu and Tan, who argue that major international firms must take more responsibility for the pressure they place on their suppliers to cut costs. They must themselves bear some of the financial burden of improving
working conditions. See Liu & TAN, supra note 1, at 81-82.
229. Id. at 75.
230. See MURDOCH & GOULD, supra note 226, at 72-76.
231. See id. at 35-61 (cataloging groups).
232. See, e.g., Ngai Pun & Wai Ling Chan, Community Based Labor Organizing, 11
Ir'L UNION RTs. 4, 10-11 (2004); Chinese Working Women Network Website, http://
www.cwwn.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
233. See, e.g., Institute for Contemporary Observation Website, http://www.icochina.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2007); see also Asia Monitor Resource Centre Website,
http://www.amrc.org.hk (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
234. An example of these can be seen in the legal clinics operated by the Law
School at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou and at East China Normal University in
Shanghai.
235. See Chinese Working Women Network Website, http://www.cwwn.org (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007).
236. See CSR in China's Supply Chains, I CSR ASIA WKLY. 15, at 1 (2005), http://
www.csr-asia.com/upload/CSR%20Asia%2OVol%201%2OWeek%2015.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
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' 23 7
ing "corporate social responsibility.
The range of initiatives in labor regulation occurring in
both the State and non-State spheres could be more productive
if there were better channels for coordinating and evaluating
them. If each measure is pursued in isolation, there is the potential for wasted resources through the simultaneous and independent adoption of overlapping and even inconsistent strategies.
To be sure, some private sector initiatives are implemented in
consultation with State agencies and official trade unions; but
this is too ad hoc and firm specific. 2 8 For systematic evaluation
of measures to occur, co-ordination must take place across a
range of firms within an industry or geographic area. Moreover,
when a measure is successful, there needs to be a way of diffusing it by enabling knowledge of it to become widespread.
Is there space to establish institutions that could coordinate
and evaluate new labor initiatives in China? Aside from the serious obstacles to implementing alternative regulatory approaches
already mentioned, there are further problems in coordinating
institutions. If an institution is concerned solely with private initiatives, then it will fail to coordinate with State and quasi-State
regulatory measures and may even provoke bureaucratic hostility

and obstruction.23 9

On the other hand, if the institution exam-

ines both private and State measures, it will need to involve State
actors and would therefore risk either being dominated by the
State bureaucracy with its command and control mentality (at
the national level) or being captured by corrupt State-business
networks (at the local level) .240 Nonetheless, while recognizing
that the prospects for successful implementation are fairly limited, this Article outlines how such institutions might work.
A locality in China (preferably one with a relatively efficient
and progressive government and a relatively capable trade union
organization) could support the establishment of a multi-party
agency, or committee, which would collect, evaluate and diffuse
information from various sources about methods used to improve compliance with labor law. Instead of simply working to
237. Chenyan Liu, China's NPC, CSR and Social Harmony, 1 CSR ASIA WKLy. 12, at 2
(2005), http://www.csr-asia.com/upload/CSR%20Asia%2Vol%201%2OWeek%2012.
pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
238. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 21, at 429.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 429-30.
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coordinate the efforts of labor departments and official trade
unions, which already occurs, the committee would include representatives from firms and from non-State actors. The agency
could seek the cooperation of these actors in its actions.
Each of the constituents could contribute to the improving
compliance by drawing on its particular regulatory strengths. Local labor bureaus could map out their compliance strategies and
use their investigation powers under the Labor Law and other
legislation to gain data about firm enforcement, 24 1 imposing
sanctions for non-disclosure.2 4 2 Trade unions could invoke their
own inspection and monitoring powers under the law. Local
and, even more importantly, international, firms could indicate
what new measures they had made to improve compliance. The
social organizations could provide information (which may well
be the most reliable data) to cross-check the other sources.
The coordinating committee would determine which initiatives were promising and successful. It could then:
" publicize the initiatives widely, to other firms, to social organizations, and to labor bureaus;
* use the initiatives to define "best practice" in the industry,
advise firms to comply with best practice; and help the
labor bureaus, unions, and other social organizations to
insist that firms adopt the practice;
* suggest to the labor bureaus that those firms that had developed successful initiatives be financially rewarded; and
* assist the labor bureaus to identify, criticize and (in cases
of refusal to improve) punish poor performers.
This process would be dynamic. Evaluation of best practice
would change from year-to-year (or according to another time
frame) as firms develop new and better ways of improving conditions.
6. More General Legal Reforms
The reforms proposed to date have all been specific to labor
law. While important in themselves, the prospects for success of
those proposals will be enhanced by wider reforms to legal institutions. Other writers have extensively canvassed such reforms
241. See, e.g., Labor Law, arts. 85-87.
242. Id. art. 101.
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and this Article will not examine them in depth. 24" The main
areas in which ongoing improvements are needed include matters such as more effective anticorruption measures focusing on
local government-business networks, better means of enforcing
legal judgments, and better judicial training, to name a few.2 4 4

Such reforms are obviously long-term undertakings in the Chinese context.
7. Campaigns and the Media
While legal reforms may lead to better enforcement, there
24 5
are of course non-legal means of addressing labor abuses.
The Chinese State has often resorted to campaigns to target social problems such as criminal activity and environmental pollution.2 " The campaigns involve the mobilization of party members and the coordinated concentration of State agency resources on the social problem.2 4 7 At times, the campaigns have

included resort to extra-legal measures, although more recently
State action is likely to be in accordance with law.
A strong campaign against labor abuses initiated by government is likely to induce labor departments, police, and other relevant agencies to deal more firmly with recalcitrant firms. A major advantage of a campaign is that it facilitates cooperation
among diverse parts of government. Thus, while labor departments do not have effective enforcement powers on their own,
the capacity to sanction is strengthened if they can credibly
threaten police action in egregious cases. 24" There is evidence
that such co-ordination is beginning to occur. In early 2006, in
what seems to have been a municipal government campaign,
eight firm owners in Shenzhen were detained for economic
243. See, e.g., LUBMAN, supra note 21; PEERENBOOM, supra note 21.

244. See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 21. See generally CHEN, supra note 21;
LuBMAN, supra note 21.
245. This is a major topic in its own right, but can be dealt with only briefly here.
246. Sarah Biddulph, The Legal Field of Policing in China: Administrative Detention and Legal Reform 62-86 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Melbourne) (on file with the University of Melbourne Library) (discussing the "hard strike"
anti-crime campaigns); van Rooij, supra note 71 at 169-77 (discussing environmental
pollution).
247. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 21, at 303; see also van Rooij, supra note 71, at 16977.
248. See Gallagher, supra note 38, at 23 (commenting on individual limitations of
regulatory agencies in labor disputes).
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crimes in connection with failure to pay wages-the first time
such action has been taken in China.2 4 9
Unfortunately, campaigns have a significant drawbackthey are ephemeral. Once a campaign ceases, attention and resources may be directed to other issues. The problem may
reemerge, unless there are institutional reforms that complement the campaign.2 5 °
Another powerful means of addressing labor abuses is the
251
media. The Chinese media regularly highlight labor abuses,
whether as part of a campaign or as a result of the work of individual journalists. Media exposure of injustice can lead to swift
governmental intervention redressing the wrong. Benjamin
Liebman notes that many Chinese believe the media are more
effective than the legal system for citizen redress. 252 Nonetheless,
as with campaigns, the media cannot substitute for legal reform.
As Liebman also points out, the media are unreliable allies and
can create injustices through misrepresentation and sensationalism. 25 3 Moreover, while the media can be extremely useful in
bringing worker abuses to the public's attention, they are not
well placed to address systematically the deficiencies which produce the abuses.
CONCLUSION
Out of the wreck of the Cultural Revolution, China's leaders
have built an economy that is gaining an ever greater share of
world manufacturing. They have thereby raised the living standards of hundreds of millions of citizens. Notoriously, this manufacturing success is marred by widespread labor abuses, epitomized by the sweatshop staffed by suffering migrant women
workers. Domestically, rising labor disputes and evidence of
emerging labor shortages stoke demands for policy reform.
Better regulatory strategies are needed to deal with these
widespread labor abuses. Confining consideration to the feasi249. Stephen Frost, China View, 2 CSR AsiA WwKv. 3 (Corporate Social Responsibility in Asia, 2005).
250. van Rooij, supra note 71, at 172-74.
251. CHAN, supra note 1, at 4-7. The accounts in Chan's study are based on media
reports of incidents which Chan has often further investigated.
252. Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal
System, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 127-30 (2005).
253. See id.
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ble rather than the ideal-accepting that radical change to
China's legal and political institutions is unlikely in the short
term-those strategies must be devised in light of the existing
institutional context. This entails analyzing the deficiencies of
those institutions and identifying opportunities for improvement. The analysis undertaken here has focused on underpayment of wages. This Article argues that the legal norms directed
at preventing this abuse need to be more coherently elaborated
and publicly accessible, although there are already considerable
improvements being made, as the draft Labor Contract Law suggests.
Much more challenging is the problem of securing compliance. The economic and social forces that deter firms from adhering to the law are frequently very powerful, and even a highly
sophisticated enforcement system would struggle to steer firms
towards legal norms. Yet, there is clearly scope for China's
framework of labor regulation to increase its authority. A fundamental difficulty is that the key state enforcement institutionslabor departments, dispute resolution bodies and the official
trade union-continue to employ bureaucratic methods increasingly anachronistic in China's private-sector driven labor markets. They operate with little active participation from the persons most affected by labor abuses and with little connection to
emerging private sector initiatives directed at creating better
workplaces. Current thinking in regulatory theory suggests that
China's current approach is misconceived, but the potential for
introducing alternative regulatory models remains limited.
Despite the limited room to maneuver, significant improvements to enforcement institutions can be implemented under
current conditions. This Article seeks to identify several such improvements; mainly extrapolations of processes already underway or based on internal critiques from Chinese scholars and
officials. Given the complexity of the social systems impacting
on the workplace in China and the relative absence of empirical
data on how law interrelates with those systems, the impact of
the reform proposals cannot be predicted; they must be provisional and revisable.
Nonetheless, the reform proposals are worth developing
and implementing as a response to present flaws. Crucially, they
can be supported and pressed by international actors concerned
with poor working conditions-governments, businesses, un-
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ions, and human rights organizations. As the proposals are feasible in the Chinese context, they enable international actors to
engage with sympathetic Chinese actors without ipso facto putting them at risk. They also enable international actors to improve in measurable ways the lives of the many exploited workers
at the hub of world industrial production.

